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Do Centrelink Activity Breach penalties coerce outcomes from unemployed 
welfare recipients in line with Mutual Obligation policy? 
 
Simon Schooneveldt  
 
Introduction 
 
The large majority of people who receive breach penalties from Centrelink are unemployed, 
in receipt of welfare payments under either the New Start Allowance program or the Youth 
Allowance program (Sleep, 2001, p.2). These programs include ‘activity test’ conditions with 
which beneficiaries must comply in order to avoid incurring breach penalties. Central to the 
whole issue of breaching penalties is the entrenched high level of unemployment (Borland, 
2000; Burgess, Mitchell, O'Brien, & Watts, 1998; Edwards, Howard, & Miller, 2001; 
Mitchell, 2000; Quiggin, 2001), together with the political ideology of Mutual Obligation 
(Kinnear, 2000; Hartman, 2001; Hammer, 2002; McKenna, 1999).  
 
This paper outlines the escalating Mutual Obligation regime implemented by the Howard 
Coalition Government. Breach penalties are defined and the increased usage of breach 
sanctions is set out, along with some reasons for that increase. A research study is introduced, 
including a basic methodology for the survey, emphasised henceforth to denote the Brisbane 
study under discussion. Some findings from the survey are outlined and evaluated in terms of 
the Howard Government’s stated expectations for its Mutual Obligation policy. Discussion 
follows, based on the findings of the survey and commentary from the literature review, 
concerning the ethics, morality and Human Rights aspects of Mutual Obligation ideology. 
Due to the impending inclusion of some people who receive Disability Support Pensions into 
the Mutual Obligation breaching regime (Anthony, 2002), some precognition of the future 
situation for such people will be included.  
 
 
The quantum of the increased rates of applied breach penalties  
 
As a consequence of expanding Mutual Obligation requirements, the number of breach 
penalties issued by Centrelink has trebled over recent years. ACOSS (2001b) provided an 
interim extrapolation of expected breach numbers for 2000-2001 in Table 1 (below).  
 
Table 1: Centrelink breaches from 1997 to 2001. 
 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2000-2001 
Type of Breach (July-June) (July-June) (July-June) (July-Feb) (July-June) 
Activity Test Breach 60,981 88,751 177,759 166,485 250,100 
Administrative Breach 59,737 76,741 124,735 65,915 99,000 
Total 120,718 165,492 302,494 232,400 349,100 
Source: Sydney Welfare Rights Centre as cited in (ACOSS, 2001b, p.5). 
 
Minister Vanstone (2002c) and ACOSS (2002) subsequently verified that the actual number 
of breaches issued in 2000-2001 was 386,946 (p.2), higher than anticipated. When compared 
with the total number of 722,000 unemployment benefit recipients in 1999-2000 as reported 
by Minister Newman (Newman, 2000, p.9) this number of breach penalties represents a 
worrying proportion. 
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The nature of breach penalties 
 
Centrelink breach penalties are part of a compliance control strategy (DEWSRB, 2001), 
whereby Centrelink is authorised to temporarily withhold partial or total payment from a 
welfare recipient deemed by a Centrelink officer to be in breach of a Centrelink 
‘administrative’ or ‘activity test’ requirement imposed under Mutual Obligation rules.  
 
Activity test breaches are more often applied by Centrelink than administrative breaches 
(ACOSS, 2001b). Activity test breach penalty rates are more costly for recipients (Moses & 
Sharples, 2000; Sleep, 2001), and are applicable to benefit payments that have an activity test 
requirement, including Youth Allowance, New Start Allowance and Austudy (Sleep, 2001, 
p.2). The activity test program extends to breaches of the Job Network’s requirements, as 
publicly funded, privately owned employment training and placement providers (Centrelink, 
2001b, p.1). There were 56 “reasons” to breach in 1998 (Moses & Sharples, 2000, p.6). 
 
Activity test penalties can reduce payments differentially depending on whether they are first, 
second or third penalties in a two-year period. For an unemployed single adult in June of 2002 
who received $185 per week, the first penalty attracts an 18 per cent reduction in payment for 
26 weeks, a total penalty of $863. The second penalty attracts a 24 per cent rate reduction in 
payment for 26 weeks, a total penalty of $1,151, whilst the third and following penalties mean 
no payment for eight weeks, a penalty of $1,476 each eight weeks (Brotherhood of St 
Lawrence, 2002, p. 2; Centrelink, 2001a). ACOSS pointed out that a third time activity breach 
represents a total “fine” or loss of benefit of  $3,384, a higher “punishment” than is applied 
for many criminal offences (pp. 3-11). 
 
 
Understanding Mutual Obligation policy: Government expectations 
 
Prime Minister Howard asserted that the Government should assist those in genuine need. He 
also noted “it is the case that – to the extent that it is within their capacity to do so – those in 
receipt of such assistance should give something back to society in return, and in the process 
improve their own prospects for self-reliance” (Howard, 1999, p.10). ‘Giving something back 
to society’ could include specified volunteer work, study to improve employment prospects or 
participation in ‘Work for the Dole’ programs. The Howard Government developed Mutual 
Obligation with expectations about the effectiveness of a robust compliance regime, designed 
to ensure that unemployed people would actively seek work and move ‘off-benefit’ quickly 
(Centrelink, 2001a; CPC, 2002, sect.6, p. 17; DEWSRB, 2001; Gilmour, Hartman & 
Jennings, 2000, p. 3; Moses & Sharples, 2000). 
 
Jennings (2001) argued that conservative forces have a common misconception: “That 
poverty is the result of primarily individual choice rather than as an outcome of social 
policies”. She argued further that the Howard Government believes people are responsible for 
their own outcomes, (even outcomes over which they have no control such as insufficient jobs 
or disability, as will be seen). Lauritsen (2001, pp. 13-14) argued that the Government, by 
disciplining those who fail in their obligations, shifted the accent “from one of a lack of 
employment to a problem with unemployed individuals” (see also Titmuss, 2000, pp.47-48; 
Watts, 2001, p. 5; Windschuttle, 1980). Therefore “blaming the victim allows policy makers 
to absolve themselves from responsibility”(p. 4), and obviates the need to provide full 
employment (Hartman, 2001, p.3).  
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Quiggin (2001) pointed out that under Mutual Obligation, “the obligations of government are 
discharged” simply by the payment of benefits alone, as the Howard Government “has 
declined to specify any full employment target” (p.12). Burgess et al. (2000) observed that 
“Mutual Obligation has now become a hallmark of the unemployment benefit system in 
Australia”. Unemployed people “are subject to more surveillance, duties, and punitive 
measures than previously”, in part because (citing Pike): “the means testing of benefits and 
tighter eligibility criteria indicate that Government sees recipients as [a] burden to the public”. 
Thus unemployment payments were no longer a right “but were now made conditional upon 
participation in employment programs” (pp. 174-186).  
 
 
Government rhetoric increases acceptance of Mutual Obligation ideology and 
encourages a willingness to apply breach penalties   
 
The Howard Government continues to announce initiatives, including improved computer 
driven, automated “paperless breach processes” (Moses & Sharples, 2000, p. 10), designed to 
compel people to urgently look for work and engage in workfare programs, such as Work for 
the Dole. These activities are politically expedient (Quiggin, 2001, pp.11-12) and Government 
rhetoric plays an important part in justifying and promoting the Mutual Obligation 
compliance process to bureaucrats and the public, by inciting opprobrium against welfare 
beneficiaries of working age. Windschuttle (1980) noted a similar phenomenon during the 
Fraser Government’s crackdown on unemployed people (pp. 218-219).  
 
Deputy Prime Minister Anderson stated that people accepting welfare payments but not 
looking hard enough for work were “deliberately shirking work” which was “not the 
Australian way” (Parnell, 2002, p. 2). Various Ministers, using derogatory terms, implied that 
many welfare recipients are “welfare cheats” and “dole bludgers” (Brough, 2001; Vanstone, 
2002b). Their thinly veiled “it is their own fault” and “flush out dole cheats” type rhetoric, 
with connotations of human bodily waste disposal, were followed up with statements 
implying that some of these people obviously “couldn’t be bothered finding a job” (Anthony, 
2000; Newman, 2000; Odgers, 2001, p. 8;). 
 
At a bureaucratic level, Government rhetoric influences Departmental and Centrelink staff 
attitudes toward the treatment of customers, as evidenced particularly by the diminution of 
fair treatment and due process (Ombudsman, 2002). From within the Department of Family 
and Community Services, Moses and Sharples (2000, pp. 11-12) conceded that “significant 
rises” in the breach rate had coincided with Mutual Obligation initiatives resulting from 
Centrelink staff becoming “more willing to impose breaches.” The Howard Government 
instructed Centrelink to increase compliance surveillance, and contractually obliged Job 
Network members to increase breach recommendations to preset target quotas (ACOSS, 
2001b, p. 2; Hannon, 2002, p.5; MacDonald & Abello, 2001, p.3; Ombudsman, 2002; Pearce, 
Disney & Ridout, 2002). ACOSS expressed concerns about high breach rates, fairness and 
due process, after obtaining a copy of INTRALINK, Centrelink’s internal policy manual 
which included the succinct edict that “job seekers must not be given the benefit of the 
doubt” (ACOSS, 2001a, pp. 6-7, bolding in original). Nevile (2001, p. 3) observed that 
“penalties have come to dominate the entire system.” As a consequence the Australian 
compliance system is “already among the toughest in the world” (ACOSS, 2001a).  
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Expansion of the Mutual Obligation breaching regime to other welfare groups  
 
Nevile’s observation related to penalties for unemployed welfare recipients, however the 
Howard Government intends to extend the Mutual Obligation breach penalty system beyond 
unemployed people. Deputy Prime Minister Anderson stated that people accepting welfare 
payments but not looking hard enough for work were “deliberately shirking work…not the 
Australian way” (Parnell, 2002, p. 2). Minister Brough had announced that “all jobless up to 
the age of 50 will be targeted for Work for the Dole programs” (Jackman, 2002, p. 5; 
Centrelink, 2001a; Moscaritolo & Keim, 2001).  Ministers Vanstone and Abbott followed up 
with a Bill to extend Mutual Obligation and activity test requirements to include single 
parents with school age children and mature aged unemployed people up to retirement age 
(McKenna, 1999; Vanstone & Abbott, 2001, p.4).  
 
Extending the net further, Minister Vanstone proposed new policy, whereby some people who 
have disabilities will be removed from Disability Support Pension eligibility, and have their 
payments cut by $26 per week by being placed on the New Start unemployment program. 
Such people will be obliged to job search, and meet the activity test requirements, subject to 
breach penalties, mandated under Mutual Obligation (Lawrence, 2002). Due to political 
opposition, Minister Anthony has been obliged to introduce an amending Second Bill into 
Parliament, watering down the requirements of the first Bill. The Second Bill provides for 
existing recipients of the Disability Support Pension to keep their pension when able to work 
for 15 hours per week, without incurring activity test requirements under Mutual Obligation. 
However, future applicants will not be so protected (Anthony, 2002).  
 
Simultaneously, Minister Vanstone continues her focus on techniques for ‘catching’ non-
genuine job seekers. Since July 2002, Centrelink can suspend all payments totally, with power 
to subsequently restore them (or not restore them), from people judged to be “at risk” of being 
breached. Such payment suspension will oblige people to come into Centrelink to “face 
additional scrutiny” in tough new face-to-face psychological assessments “which will be the 
last thing a cheater wants”. The new system will ensure that “a robust mutual obligation 
system still exists” (Centrelink, 2002; Vanstone, 2002a, pp. 2-4). Simply increasing the 
number of hoops through which a recipient must jump results in disincentive, so that some 
people leave the system even when fully eligible to receive payment (Goodin 2001). Moses 
and Sharples (2000) reported that for a “very conservative 27%…the system just becomes too 
hard and that they turn instead to relatives, the welfare sector or crime for support” (p. 17).  
 
Professor Pearce, an ex-Ombudsman, also believed that being breached actually created 
disincentives to seek work, reduced the ability to look for work, and thereby harmed the 
chances of individuals finding employment, contrary to the Government’s policy wishes. 
Noting the counter productive nature of breaching, Professor Pearce remarked that he 
“personally believed that you don’t induce” by “beating up” but by offering an inducement of 
“help” (ABC, 2002).  
 
 
Introduction to the methodology of the survey conducted  
 
A qualitative intensive questionnaire type survey, hereafter referred to as the survey, was 
undertaken in Brisbane. Thirty-three questions were prepared, including four on 
demographics. Remaining questions were framed to elicit data about breaching experiences 
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and outcomes for individual respondents who had been breached. The literature review and 
data derived from Government policy publications facilitated preparation of the questions, 
which were designed to reflect and test Government policy statements. It was recognised that 
only a limited sample size could realistically be collected, without a control group, and the 
responses gathered are essentially people’s accounts of their individual perceptions of what 
has been happening to them (Burns, 1990, pp. 9-11). The survey included an element of field 
research, because the researcher met the respondents, liased with various authorities and 
conducted correspondence, meetings and discussions with a variety of Centrelink managers. 
The behaviour exhibited by Centrelink managers suggested that all staff were very aware that 
Mutual Obligation breach activities are resented by Centrelink ‘customers’, and several 
branch managers spoke about the “nature” of their Centrelink customers in derogatory terms.  
 
 
Some findings from this survey 
 
The findings of the survey reflect what happened to the 56 survey respondents when they 
were breached. Such findings, on their own, do not establish that being breached causes these 
things to happen to people. In Table 2, below, the numbers of people breached in the survey 
are shown from 1999 through to the first four months of 2002, enumerated by gender, age and 
whether breaches were issued before or after one year of receipt of benefit. 
 
Table 2: Analysis of breach numbers from the survey respondents by age and gender 
YEAR
TOTAL NO. 
OF PEOPLE 
BREACHED
MALES FEMALES AGE <30 YEARS
AGE >30 
YEARS
TOTAL NO. 
OF 
BREACHES
LESS THAN 
ONE YEAR
MORE 
THAN ONE 
YEAR
1999 17 9 8 7 10 22 8 9
2000 17 15 2 10 7 27 11 6
2001 25 17 8 16 9 37 16 9
4 MTHS OF 2002 28 20 8 18 10 40 23 5
  
From the initial response tallies, a few figures stood out: 
• 95% of respondents (53 people) thought that, when breached, Centrelink was unfair. 
• 93% of respondents (52 people) felt their self-esteem had decreased after being breached.  
• 91% of respondents (51 people) did not realise beforehand, that they were to be breached. 
• 21% of respondents (12 people) needed to move into less desirable accommodation. 
 
 
Findings on Government expectations relative to coercive breaching policy and practice 
 
Just as the Howard Government has been obliged to amend its current Parliamentary Bills on 
Disability Reform legislation due to political opposition on grounds of unfair hardship (noted 
above), similarly in July 1997 the Howard Government had its breach penalty program passed 
by Parliament only after three amendments. The second reading of the Social Security 
Amendment Bill noted that the main objective was “to maintain a strong deterrence for failure 
to meet reasonable requirements”. It was thought that rigorous application of activity test 
requirements would encourage active job search by beneficiaries (Moses & Sharples, 2000, p. 
4). Under Mutual Obligation ideology, the coercion is intended to enhance the chances of 
people finding work by keeping them “active and connected” with the workplace (Centrelink, 
2001a; Parnell, 2002, p.2; Richardson, 2000). The Commonwealth Productivity Commission 
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concurred; “a breaching regime is an important part of ensuring that unemployment 
beneficiaries seriously engage in job search or measures that improve their employability” 
(CPC, 2002, Sect. 6, p.17).  
 
Yet in this survey 32 out of the 56 respondents felt they could not look any harder for 
work under their circumstances and a further 9 ‘did not know’. The Howard Government 
expected that compulsory engagement in Mutual Obligation type job search related activities 
would be accepted by unemployment benefit recipients, as being useful for job search as a 
‘normal’ part of ‘reasonable’ job-seeker responsibilities (DEWRSB, 2000; Howard, 1999; 
Lauritsen, 2001; Moses & Sharples, 2000; Newman, 2000). However this survey found that 
73% of respondents, 41 out of 56 people, believed that they were not more likely to get paid 
work because of any Centrelink compulsory activity undertaken, which would suggest 
the requirements were viewed as unrealistic and unreasonable.  
 
The Howard Government also expected that one breach would be sufficient to deter people 
from being breached again (ACOSS, 2001b, p.3; DEWRSB, 2001, p. 11; Burgess et al., 2000; 
Moses & Sharples, 2000). In that belief, the Government has consistently tightened its 
breaching regime by increasing penalty costs and schedules (Atkins, 2002; Pearce et al., 
2002). However the majority of respondents to this survey reported that getting breached was 
of no help to them in avoiding further breaches. Indeed the majority of respondents (56%) 
were breached more than once, and 14% had third breaches. This accords with the literature 
(ACOSS, 2001b). 
 
Prime Ministerial statements outlined the Government’s need to exhibit “fairness” by 
providing  “equality of opportunity” for unemployed people who comply with Mutual 
Obligation, because compliance improves their “prospects for self-reliance” and self-esteem 
(Howard, 1999, pp. 2-9). However an overwhelming majority (95%) believed that 
Centrelink was being unfair to them. This survey found that most respondents (91%) did 
not realise beforehand that they were about to be breached, which suggests Centrelink 
exhibited a lack of concern about customer rights, due process and procedural fairness.  
 
The Howard Government had assumed that people were not trying hard enough to find work, 
and were therefore ‘non-genuine’ job seekers needing “coercive authority” (Atkins, 2002, p.1; 
Edwards et al., 2001; Kinnear, 2000, p.10; Moses & Sharples, 2000.  p. 16). Therefore the 
Government stated its intent to target almost all unemployed people through Centrelink’s 
‘enhanced’ activity testing and breaching program under Mutual Obligation (Centrelink, 
2001a; Jackman, 2002, p. 5), because this (coercion) would “make it harder for people to 
choose welfare over work” (McKenna, 1999, p. 11). Minister Anthony argued that 
compliance with Mutual Obligation requirements would “leave people with a sense of pride 
and belonging” (Anthony, 2000, p.1). Those ‘not trying hard enough’ were considered 
‘unworthy’ of welfare benefits, and as a further deterrent would have their self-esteem 
attacked through public rhetoric and Centrelink service delivery practices (ACOSS, 2001a, 
p.2; Bryson, 1993; Hall, 1998; Hartman, 2001; Kinnear, 2000; Schooneveldt, 2002; 
Tomlinson, 1999). Reflecting the ‘success’ of these particular policies, this survey found most 
people (93%) reported a loss of self-esteem and many felt Centrelink put pressure on them 
to go ‘off-benefit’ permanently.  
 
It is unstated Government policy that Centrelink breaching practices are intended to drive 
unemployed welfare recipients ‘off-benefit’, obliging them to seek support for survival 
 8 
elsewhere. The literature suggests that governments with neo-liberal agendas seek to relocate 
responsibility for welfare back to community welfare agencies, church groups and the 
families of individual welfare recipients (Burgess et al., 1998; Burgess et al., 2000; Donald, 
2000; Harris, 1998; Sleep, 2001; Stilwell, 1993). Government policies are often unstated 
(Bridgman & Davis, 2000).  
 
In this survey, 23 people indicated that, once breached, they obtained assistance from 
family, 15 people indicated being helped by charities and seven indicated that their 
church was of help. In each of the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, six respondents nominated 
‘charity’ as a source of help. However in the first 4 months of 2002, eight people nominated 
‘charity’. These increasing rates of charity support need are in line with the literature 
(ACOSS, 2001b; Horan, 2001; Nevile, 2001, p. 30; Stavropoulos, 2000). Figure 1, below, 
illustrates the categories of assistance sought by the respondents to the survey. 
 
Figure 1: 
Categories of assistance sought by respondents
23
15
14
7
7
5
Family
Welfare Charity Agency
Friends
Your Church
Other
Welfare Rights Group
Just as Government policy can be unstated, or merely hinted at, there also exists a body of 
literature that identifies ‘the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action’ (Merton, 
1936). See also Burgess et al. (2000) and Sleep (2001), whereby Government may accept 
unanticipated policy outcomes as collateral damage. For example, a consequence of being 
breached for welfare recipients is that accommodation standards can be reduced, as was noted 
in the literature (ACOSS, 2001b; Pearce et al., 2002). Indeed, from this survey, 12 people out 
of 56 (almost 22%) reported needing to move into less desirable accommodation because 
of inability to pay rent after even the first breach. They included 10 males under 30 years of 
age, three of whom wrote “on the streets” and one reported  “men’s homeless shelter” on the 
survey form. Whether unintended or unexpected or not, the Government is aware that many 
people who are breached become homeless and it has not altered its breaching policy, as 
noted in the National Welfare Rights Network’s (2002) submission to the Senate Community 
Affairs Reference Committee (p.6).  
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One of the three locations where the survey was conducted is in a relatively lower socio-
economic area compared with the other two locations, and more people here appeared to 
suffer from a reduced ability to afford accommodation, needing to move to less desirable 
accommodation as a consequence of being breached. Figure 2, below, differentiates the 
proportion of individuals who were breached in higher and lower socio-economic areas, who 
needed to move to less desirable accommodation. Almost one half of respondents were 
affected in the lower socio-economic area. Thus the most vulnerable low-income people are 
driven into sub-standard housing.  
 
Figure 2: 
T h e  t o t a l ,  h ig h e r  a n d  lo w e r  s o c io - e c o n o m ic  r e s p o n d e n t s  m o v in g  in t o  
le s s  d e s ir a b le  a c c o m m o d a t io n
5 6
4 2
1 4
1 2
6 6
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1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
T o ta l n u m b e r  o f  r e s p o n d e n ts
f r o m  a l l  s o c io - e c o n o m ic  a r e a s
R e s p o n d e n ts  f r o m  h ig h e r
s o c io - e c o n o m ic  a r e a s
R e s p o n d e n ts  f r o m  lo w e r
s o c io - e c o n o m ic  a r e a s
T o ta l n u m b e r  o f  re s p o n s e s
L e s s  d e s ir a b le  a c c o m m o d a t io n
 
 
Discussion 
  
The Howard Government’s expectations for Mutual Obligation policy contrast markedly with 
the lived experiences of the 56 respondents to this survey, which in many aspects may be 
considered policy failures. However, this does not complete the analysis. This study found 
that people who were breached had their lives seriously affected in other important areas, such 
as being dealt with ethically, which the Howard Government does not publicly acknowledge.  
 
Kinnear (2000) examined Mutual Obligation for The Australia Institute, and found that “the 
ethical foundations of the Howard Government’s Mutual Obligation policies do not stand up 
to scrutiny” for a number of reasons. One reason was that “Australia’s system of economic 
management [which] has relied on creating joblessness to sustain economic growth” is unjust. 
Another reason was that proponents of Mutual Obligation willingly impose activity 
requirements on unemployed people, in the belief “that unemployed people have some control 
over their joblessness, and therefore a choice to accept or reject welfare benefits”. However 
the proponents “are mistaken, because realistically, there is no choice” (p. v). As Lawrence 
(2002) had pointed out, there are “still ten job seekers for every one vacancy” and “getting 
tough” on “dole bludgers” cannot fix any unemployment problem (pp. 2-4). Yet the 
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Government is seeking to add a significant proportion of people currently on the Disability 
Support Pension, who are also unemployed, to the New Start program (Anthony, 2002).  
 
Goodin (2001) noted that lack of choice about receiving welfare, arguing that obliging people 
to sign contractual activity agreements in return for welfare benefits lacked moral force. The 
notion “agree or starve” (by losing benefit payment) was analogous to the highway robber’s 
demand “your money or your life!” (p. 191). Kinnear (2000) cited Rawls, who argued that 
Government institutional programs “must be just, and individuals must have freely accepted 
the benefits provided by society”. Finding those two conditionalities were not met, Kinnear 
declared that the Howard Government’s Mutual Obligation policies failed ethically and 
morally, because they imposed obligation only upon the least financially advantaged people, 
thus eroding “the ethical case for a social contract”. Further, when people in positions of 
social advantage demand social repayments from people who are disadvantaged, as happens 
under Mutual Obligation, that “may be a manifestation of moral decline” (pp. v-vi, italics in 
original; see also Hammer, 2002). Such arguments on ethics and moral decline become cogent 
when considering the Government’s intended legislation to include people who have 
disabilities in the Mutual Obligation regime. 
 
The harshness of the Mutual Obligation regime raises the possibility that the Howard 
Government’s intent in dealing with unemployed welfare recipients, and now single parents 
and disability pensioners, is to treat all unemployed people in a different manner to other 
people (Hartman, 2001, pp. 5-6). For example, the Commonwealth Ombudsman found 
Centrelink was applying breaches “without due process” (McLeod, 2001, p.51) and was ‘too 
quick to breach’ (Eldridge, 2001). Breach penalty levels often exceed the value of fines 
imposed for many criminal convictions ACOSS (2001b, pp. 3-11). It also needs to be 
remembered that Government adherence to the tenets of economic fundamentalism ensures 
that “Australia’s system of economic management has relied on creating joblessness to 
sustain economic growth” (Kinnear, 2000, p. v), thus fostering inequality. As noted from this 
survey, 95% of respondents felt that Centrelink treated them unfairly in regard to breaching. 
 
Lawrence (2002) argued that the coercive requirements of Mutual Obligation are excessive 
because they have little to do with a willingness to work. Most people, including people who 
have disabilities, want to work and actively look for it (ACOSS, 2001a, p.5; McKinnon & 
Dorries, 1999; Quiggin, 2001). Goodin (2001) argued that “most of those who want to work, 
but don’t”, are unemployed due to external circumstances that have “nothing to do with the 
sort of ‘weakness of will’ arguments” so often heard (pp. 196-197). Indeed, Windschuttle 
(1980) had debunked the myth of “dole bludgers” twenty years earlier (pp. 155-179).  
 
In an international context, Tomlinson (2001) argued that the Howard Government’s Mutual 
Obligation agenda is considered to breach Article 8(3)(a) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: “No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory 
labour”, which Australia has signed and ratified (pp. 10-11). (See also Burgess et al., 1998, p. 
17; Rees, 2000, pp. 296-297). Ironically, also in an international context, Howard 
Government coercion meant to reduce mythical ‘welfare dependency’ is demonstrably 
unnecessary. In a seminal longitudinal study conducted over 10 years in The United States, 
the Netherlands and Germany, Goodin, Heady, Muffels, and Dirven (1999) found an 
“exceedingly small percentage” of people remained on welfare indefinitely, in any of those 
national welfare systems. Further, they found the rhetoric of “welfare dependency” referred to 
in those countries, and often heard in Australia, to be unfounded (pp. 136-145).  
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Conclusion 
 
As noted, although this small survey cannot be applied to outcomes for all people who have 
been breached, the findings are largely consistent with commentary in the literature, including 
experiences reported by community welfare agencies (ACOSS, 2002). In the current climate 
of entrenched unemployment, it is evident that the Howard Government’s coercive Mutual 
Obligation breaching practices have not succeeded. Whether intentionally or unintentionally 
designed to drive people off benefits toward community provided support or employment, the 
experience has not been a successful one for the unemployed people surveyed, and these 
people did not have a disability.  
 
This survey found that people who were breached did have their lives seriously affected 
negatively, although often the Howard Government does not publicly acknowledge such 
outcomes have resulted from its Mutual Obligation ideology. This survey found that Mutual 
Obligation policy and mandatory activity test requirements did lead to people being readily 
breached, experiencing financial hardship and frustration and experiencing decreased self-
esteem with strong feelings of being unfairly treated. A larger than expected proportion of 
people who were breached, even for a first time, needed to move into less desirable 
accommodation, with three reporting “moved onto streets”. The latter fact confirms a need for 
further research in this area and provides evidence that the policies and breaching practices 
implemented under Mutual Obligation strike at the most vulnerable and least advantaged 
group of people (who did not even have any reported disability) within the Brisbane 
community (ACOSS, 2000, p. 2; 2001b; Nevile, 2001).  
 
The plight of the unemployed people surveyed, who did not have a disability, and who have 
been breached, presents a different picture of their life circumstances than that which the 
Howard Government’s rhetoric seeks to conjure. The Government still boastfully proclaims 
the effectiveness of the “safety net” which is provided to “protect” people who are “genuinely 
in need” and deserving of welfare support (Howard, 1999, p. 4; Vanstone, 2002a). ‘Living on 
the streets’ is viewed as a personal choice. Now unemployed people, and soon, single parents 
and people who have a disability, whose only source of income is a welfare benefit, can also 
have their payments fully suspended by Centrelink on grounds of ‘suspicion’ that they ‘might’ 
not comply with future activity or administrative requirements (Vanstone, 2002a). Perhaps 
this new travesty of fair treatment towards welfare recipients accords with what the Howard 
Government calls “tough love” (McKenna, 1999).  
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